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Abstract 
This paper proposes a new analytical framework for a comprehensive and 
comparative study of international interventions by proposing a dynamic regime 
model of state-building interventions. Its aim is to outline a way to close certain 
gaps in the debate on interventions, particularly the fractured nature of many 
“lessons learned” and the neglect of intervention processes. In its first part, the 
paper explores the need for such a model in the context of our changing world 
order since the end of the Cold War. In its second part, the paper suggests that 
state-building interventions provide a useful new focus for the academic and 
political debate on international interventions. In its third part, the paper outlines 
a new analytical framework grounded in regime analysis. This new analytical 
framework not only includes a dynamic regime model which builds on pervious 
PIN research, but also proposes the concept of intervention capacity. 
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1. Introduction 
“We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free 
markets, and free trade to every corner of the world. The events of 
September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can 
pose a great danger to our national interests as strong states.” 
– U.S. President George W. Bush in 20021 
 
International intervention has become a core problem of world politics today. 
The above given statement by U.S. President Bush highlights the (renewed) 
impact of the question of intervention on the United States, the most powerful 
state of the world, whose political scene is currently preoccupied with the U.S.-
led intervention in Iraq. It also shows the realization by a larger group of 
decision-makers that intervention is not only a question of primarily 
humanitarian concern, as some tried to put it in the current past, but touches on 
a wider range of  interests, ideas and values. Today, because of so many forms 
of global interdependence, national interests cannot be defined without due 
consideration to what happens inside other states. This consciousness is 
complemented by other insights. Iraq was a military invasion that turned into a 
complex state-building intervention because its success could not be based on 
military strategy alone. Like all previous interventions after the end of the Cold 
War, Iraq has shown that international intervention has increasingly turned into 
a more difficult and uncertain undertaking, which, because of its very nature, 
faces unique challenges of legitimacy and operational complexity. 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, forced decision-makers and the 
public in industrialized countries to focus (again) on the fundamental question of 
the post-Cold War era: in what world do we live in? Now international terrorism 
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction shape not only the 
discourse on security but dominate much of the rest of the international agenda 
on an unprecedented level.2 Interestingly enough though, this strong new focus 
                                                 
1
 The White House (2002): National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 
Washington DC, published on 17 September 2002, Foreword by President George W. Bush; 
available electronically at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.  
2
 Opinion polls: World Views 2002, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and German Marshall 
Fund of the United States, covering the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, 
Poland and the Netherlands, available at: http://www.worldviews.org/. For more recent 
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has just reinforced the need to answer the above given question. This is 
because international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction are closely connected to another question that has featured 
prominently on the international agenda since the end of the Cold War: what 
should the international community do with weak or failed states (plagued by 
internal violent conflict) and rogue states (governed by authoritarian regimes 
who threaten the security and values of the international community)? 
International intervention has increasingly become the preferred answer to this 
question. 
This paper wants to explain the political nature of the most difficult 
contemporary international intervention, intervention aimed at state-building, 
and suggest a new analytical answer on the challenges it poses to scholars and 
policy-makers. Today, we still conceptualize the state as the principal unit for 
providing order in the world we live in. This is why weak, failed and rogue states 
pose an important challenge and why most current interventions focus in one 
way or another on state-building, which means on establishing or reconstructing 
a state with sovereign rights and duties as defined by the international 
community. This often requires authors of intervention to assume direct 
authority in other societies, to an extent unparalleled since the end of 
colonialism and the ideological struggle of the Cold War. These latter political 
associations and the current universality of the legal norm of state sovereignty, 
that means the full political independence of a state from outside authorities 
unless it has voluntarily consented to accept them, pose a political and moral 
dilemma for authors of intervention. They have to come up with an answer on 
how they want to reconcile their undertaking with the peoples’ right to self-
determination and the norm of state sovereignty, which is supposed to secure 
international order, the very some goal that the authors eventually have to claim 
as the legitimate basis of their state-building intervention. 
                                                                                                                                               
examples, which already show some changes, see: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations’ 
Global Views 2004 poll , covering the United States, Mexico and South Korea, available at: 
http://www.ccfr.org/globalviews2004/index.htm.  
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In this sense, it should have become clear that providing an answer to the 
question “who will intervene where, when, how and for what purpose?”, will 
reveal much about the world we live in today. Who is the international 
community if there is any? How does it decide what is a weak or failed state and 
what is a rogue state? What are the sovereign rights and duties that are 
currently attributed to a state? Who holds or claims political authority 
(legitimacy) and control (power) in the world we live in? Often values and power 
are treated separately in world politics, but only when they are treated as 
intertwined, we truly know in which order we live in.3 Power is not used as a 
means in itself but to achieve certain goals that are derived from ideas and 
values, while values that are not backed up by power can hardly provide order 
when challenged.  
Unfortunately, the debate on international intervention has produced much 
confusion so far, because it had largely focused on the policies for intervention 
that different schools of political philosophy prescribe or on fragmented 
analyses of the “lessons learned”. I am convinced that who will intervene where, 
when, how and for what purpose, is an inherently political question that will be 
decided differently from case to case, not the least because it will depend on 
the perceptions, values and beliefs of those persons who have the authority and 
power to order an intervention on behalf of the state or organization they lead.4 
Thus, a general theory of international interventions is of little use and other 
scholars have failed to produce a generally accepted one. What is more useful 
is to produce generalizations on the political challenge that current interventions 
pose to decision-makers and analysts alike. Analysts have called for coherent 
                                                 
3
 This is analogous to politics in any concrete organized human entity, for example the state. It 
is worth noting that a similar argument was presented in an original way in Philip Bobbitt (2002): 
The Shield of Achilles. War, Peace, and the Course of History, New York. He argues that on the 
international level (military) power (he calls it ‘strategy’) and values (‘law’) have to be treated 
intertwined to understand the international order we live in. 
4
 For similar arguments, see: Jon Western (2004): Doctrinal Divisions. The Politics of US 
Military Interventions, in: Harvard International Review 26, Spring 2004, pp. 46-50; Karen A. 
Feste (2003): Intervention. Shaping the Global Order, Westport CT (analysing U.S. intervention 
policies); and Bill McSweeny (1999): Security, Identity and Interests. A Sociology of 
International Relations, Cambridge, especially his chapter 11: Conclusion: Security and moral 
choice, pp. 198-219 . 
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intervention strategies, admitting at the same time that any intervention is a 
product of political negotiation and compromise. 
If any intervention is the result of political negotiation and compromise, we 
should not focus so much on when and how they ought to take place, but the 
processes that make them happen or not and that lead them to success or 
failure. I want to argue that if we analyze in a coherent and comprehensive way 
the political decision-making processes of past international interventions, we 
can learn a lot more about where the debate on international interventions is 
leading us and how future international interventions might look like. This can 
also serve as basis for policy advice to decision-makers and provide additional 
insights for analysts on what constitutes our current world order. As a result, I 
want to propose a model of analysis of international interventions for state-
building that will be able to produce such useful generalizations on the political 
processes that are behind interventions. In order to accomplish this, I organized 
this paper into three respective main parts. 
In the first part, I will outline the contemporary context of international 
intervention. I will argue that despite claims to the contrary, the state has 
remained the most important concept in world politics, but its terms of reference 
have changed. In our globalized world, the state has to cope with an extended 
security concept (human security) that has repercussions on its sovereignty 
(sovereign responsibility). All this is related to the context of our post-Cold War 
global order with its changed power and value structure.  
In the second part of the paper, I want to show which type of intervention 
matters most in our post-Cold War order and discuss briefly the analytical 
debate on international intervention and its gaps. Analysts have produced 
valuable studies of past interventions and we can build on them. But we still 
lack a coherent comparative analysis of the political processes behind 
interventions, in which, as I will argue, the interplay between ideas, interests 
and power is fundamental. While international intervention aimed at state-
building promises to be the most effective and ultimate tool to address the many 
problems we face in this order, its very nature poses a major challenge to any 
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policy-maker. I will present a definition of state-building interventions to 
determine a list of relevant cases on which the analysis can be based. An 
analysis of the political processes of negotiation promises to show how these 
factors have interacted and influenced the decisions of policy-makers since the 
end of the Cold War. 
The third part contains the analytical framework I propose. I will argue that 
such interventions fit the definition of international regimes, which are generally 
defined as “sets of implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area 
of international relations.”5 This allows me to adopt a model for regime analysis 
as it has been developed by the scholars of the “Processes of International 
Negotiation” (PIN) project at the International Institute of Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA).6 Through its systemic focus on the evolutionary nature of 
regimes, we can use the model to analyze the structures and processes of past 
interventions. If we cross this analysis with one of what I want to call 
“intervention capacity”, that means the legal (international law), conceptual 
(various general reports and policy documents on the topic) and physical 
(resources and personnel) framework of intervention as it developed on 
different levels since the end of the Cold War, we should be able to show which 
ideas, values, interests and powers shaped the decisions of relevant actors. 
It should have become clear from what I have said so far, that my approach 
to the question of intervention is limited. Due to the nature of the topic, I will 
work primarily with theoretical concepts of the academic field of International 
Relations. As within any field of social science, I face the problem of ambiguous 
terms and concepts. This is why I have to be clear about my basic assumptions 
with which I frame the problem of intervention. But I do not want to base my 
argument on any grand theory. Instead, I aim to identify relevant ideas, things 
and events as they are commonly understood by experts and laypersons alike, 
adding analytical clarity where necessary and leaving ambiguity where possible. 
                                                 
5
 Stephen D. Krasner (ed., 1983): International Regimes, Ithaca NY, p. 2. 
6
 Betram I. Spector and I. William Zartman (eds., 2003): Getting it done. Post-agreement 
Negotiation and International Regimes, Washington DC. 
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In this respect, I will have to engage in some limited theory building, especially 
when I present the model for analysis of the processes of regimes of 
international state-building intervention, but I do not want to build any general 
theory on intervention. 
 
2. World Order: The Context and Relevance of Intervention 
The world we live in – the meaning of ‘world order’ 
As already outlined in the introduction, intervention has become a core 
problem of world politics because it is related to world order. Indeed, as with 
any other concept, intervention has only meaning to us when we can place it in 
its proper context. Explaining this context will eventually allow me to narrow 
down the concept of intervention, because its common usage is far too broad 
for any useful analysis. The goal is to produce a definition of intervention that is 
not only more precise for the purpose of analysis but also relevant enough for 
the given context. 
The context of intervention is provided by what I want to call ‘world order’, 
whose traditional name in the academic field of International Relations is 
‘international system’ (or ‘international order’, respectively).7 At times I might 
use both terms synonymously, applying to the latter a broader understanding 
than simply ‘states-system’.8 I give the term world order some preference not 
because it might have become somehow fashionable recently to use it again in 
public debate9, but because it seems a more comprehensive term to refer to the 
                                                 
7
 For similar discussion on what should be the term for the subject of the academic field of 
International Relations, ‘international relations’ or ‘world politics’, see John Baylis and Steve 
Smith (eds., 2001): The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International 
Relations, Oxford 2nd edition, pp. 2-3. For a general discussion of the concept of order in world 
politics, see Ian Clark (2001): Globalization and the Post-Cold War Order, in: Baylis and Smith 
(eds., 2001), pp. 634-648. For a discussion of ‘world order’ as an approach to world politics, see 
Richard Falk (1987): The Promise of World Order. Essays in Normative International Relations, 
Philadelphia PA. As will become clear in this article, I do not intend to follow the normative 
approach of this perspective but use ‘world order’ as an overarching concept that tries to 
capture how persons, ideas and things are related to each other on a global scale. 
8
 In its broader sense it is used for example by: Barry Buzan and Richard Little (2000): 
International Systems in World History. Remaking the Study of International Relations, Oxford. 
9
 For three recent examples, see: Robert Kagan (2003): Of Paradise and Power. America and 
Europe in the New World Order, New York NY; Francis Fukuyama (2004): State Building. 
Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century, Ithaca NY, or Anne-Marie Slaughter 
(2004): A New World Order, Princeton NJ. 
 8
way in which people and things are arranged in relation to each other on a 
global scale.10 The problem with the term ‘international’ is that it often implies to 
refer to relations between nation-states alone, a pitfall that I want to avoid. This 
is also the reason why I do not apply the similar term ‘international society’.11 
Sometimes I will refer to the term ‘international community’, another similar 
term, but it implies more intimacy in the sense of shared values between actors 
in global affairs and for this reason I will only use it where it is appropriate in this 
sense.12 
An important aspect of the term ‘world order’ is that it implies the absence of 
chaos in our global affairs and thus makes it easier for laypersons to 
understand the meaning of ‘international anarchy’, which is such an important 
concept for scholars. International Relations scholars commonly assume that 
we live in an anarchical international system, meaning that the highest political 
authority in world politics lies with the nation-state, or better those who act on its 
behalf. Thus, international anarchy does not mean global chaos but the 
absence of a world government.13 
This usefulness of the term world order for non-scholars already hints at 
another advantage; the term allows me to keep some theoretical pluralism in my 
discussion of the context of international intervention, because it can 
incorporate assumptions of the traditional mainstream ‘structural-realist’ and the 
                                                 
10
 See Clark (2001), p. 637, who describes ‘world order’ as “this is a wider category of order 
than the ‘international’. It takes as its units of order not states, but individual human beings and 
assesses the degree of order on the basis of the delivery of certain kinds of goods (be it 
security, human rights, basic needs for justice) for humanity as a whole.” I understand ‘world 
order’ as spanning all levels of analysis, not only the individual one, although I agree that its 
ultimate and most basic level is the human being. 
11
 Most famously articulated in Hedley Bull (1977): The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in 
World Politics, London. 
12
 For a detailed discussion of the term in the context of modern international law and United 
Nations practice, see Don Greig (2002): ‘International Community’, ‘Interdependence’ and All 
That … Rhetorical Correctness?, in: Gerard Kreijen (ed., 2002): State, Sovereignty, and 
International Governance, Oxford, pp. 521-603. 
13
 For a discussion of the concepts of anarchy and government, see Helen Milner (1991): The 
Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique, in: Review of International 
Studies 17, pp. 67-85. 
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‘idealist’ approaches to world politics.14 Thus, as I have already stressed in the 
introduction, world order should be understood as a result of the interplay 
between power and values.15 In this sense, I am in agreement with the so-called 
‘constructivist’ approach in International Relations, although I do not want to 
share the extent of its statism (i.e. to treat the state itself as a unitary actor in 
international relations).16 But by no means do I want to deny the importance of 
the state as a practical and analytical concept in the mind of scholars, politicians 
and the general public – on the contrary! This will be explained in more detail 
below but let us first turn to the more practical meaning of world order. 
After the end of the Cold War, the term world order became famous, later 
notorious for a while, when U.S. President George H.W. Bush used it to 
mobilize support for the preparations of a U.S.-led international intervention to 
end the occupation of Kuwait, which had been invaded and occupied by Iraq in 
August 1990.17 In his State of the Union Address on January 29, 1991, he 
declared to the American people with respect to the intervention: 
“What is at stake is more than one small country, it is a big idea – a new 
world order, where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause 
to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind: peace and security, 
freedom, and the rule of law. […] The world can therefore seize this 
opportunity to fulfil the long-held promise of a new world order – where 
brutality will go unrewarded, and aggression will meet collective 
resistance. Yes, the United States bears a major share of leadership in 
this effort.”18 
                                                 
14
 Cf. Charles Kegley (ed., 1995): Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and 
the Neoliberal Challenge, New York NY, and Stephen Walt (1998): International Relations: One 
World, Many Theories, in: Foreign Policy 110, pp. 29-46. 
15
 In terms of IR theory, I think the term world order can include great power configurations 
(bilateral-multilateral-unilateral), which is the focus of realists, norms and rules of international 
institutions (organizations and regimes), which is the focus of neoliberal institutionalists, and the 
interplay between social and individual norms, values and beliefs, which is the focus of 
constructivists. I already stated above my preference for the latter of the three, but that does not 
mean, that the first two factors do not play a role in explaining decision-making of leaders (as 
we will see later on, regime theory can incorporate all three approaches). 
16
 Initially proposed in: Alexander Wendt (1992): Anarchy is what States Make of it. The Social 
Construction of Power Politics, in: International Organization 46, pp. 391-425, and elaborated in 
more detail in: Alexander Wendt (1999): Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge. 
17
 He used it for the first time in a speech to the U.S. Congress on September 11, 1990, 
mentioning the creation of a “new world order” as his fifth objective in rejecting the aggression of 
Iraq against Kuwait. 
18
 The full text is available electronically at the American Presidency Project of the University of 
California at Santa Barbara: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/site/docs/doc_sou.php?doc=835.  
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As a consequence, a public debate on this term started.19 Bush’s reference 
to nation-states (“diverse nations”) and interstate aggression did not paint the 
full picture of what his invoked new world order had to cope with. Obviously he 
had outlined a primarily political-legal ‘new world order’ centered on the concept 
of the traditional nation-state, neglecting or subsuming other areas that would 
soon rise to prominence, like the economy, culture and the environment. It was 
pointed out that his envisioned new order was supposed to rest on four main 
principles which were in conflict with each other: state sovereignty, self-
determination of peoples, constitutional and democratic governments in each 
state, and the universal protection of human rights (as became clear later, the 
establishment of a free market should be added as a fifth principle and 
sustainable development could be added as a sixth).20 A main problem was that 
obviously the existing nation-state concept could not accommodate all political-
legal principles at the same time and that there was no authority beyond the 
nation-state that could adjudicate between them (given the limitations of 
international law and international organizations). This soon became obvious 
when violent nationalist and ethnic conflict erupted around the world on an 
unprecedented scale since the end of the Second World War. Some then 
termed the new era sarcastically the ‘new world disorder’.21 
In sum, there was little doubt that the order of the Cold War era was over, but 
there was much uncertainty about what had replaced it.22 This uncertainty is 
                                                 
19
 For a very critical account refusing the notion ‘new world order’ because there is no real 
difference to the economic imperialism of the ‘old world order’, see Noam Chomsky (1996): 
World Orders Old and New, New York. 
20
 Cf. e.g. Stanley Hoffmann (1992): Delusions of World Order, in: The New York Review of 
Books, April 9, 1992, p. 37, Michael Barnett (1997): Bringing in the New World Order. 
Liberalism, Legitimacy, and the New World Order, in: World Politics 49, pp. 526-551, and 
Roland Paris (1997): Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism, in: International 
Security 22, pp. 54-89. 
21
 See for example: James Joyce (1998): New World Disorder, in: The New York Review of 
Books, December 17, 1998, reviewing George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft (1998): A World 
Transformed, New York NY. Jonathan Goodhand and David Hulme (1999): From Wars to 
Complex Emergencies. Understanding Conflict and Peace-Building in the New World Disorder, 
in: Third World Quarterly 20, pp. 13-26.  
22
 Bobbitt (2002), calls the end of the Cold War the end of the ‘Long War’ (1914-89), an idea 
and term that was inspired by the British historian Eric Hobsbawm, who had called the 20th 
century the ‘short century’, see Eric Hobsbawm (1994): Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth 
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reflected in the label that we have attached to our times by referring to it as the 
‘post-Cold War era’ – although it can now be argued to have a 
contender/successor in the term ‘war on terror’.23 Thus, the term world order 
came somehow out of fashion because of the many instances of disorder that 
were observable. 
‘Globalization’ became the new buzzword for the more general public as well 
as scholars and politicians.24 Globalization was largely seen as covering the 
economic, social and environmental domains of world politics, less the political-
military one.25 The growing power of many transnational and non-state 
organizations and the corresponding relative decline of state power in those 
areas that were usually perceived as being affected by globalization raised 
serious doubts with many people about the legitimacy of the political processes 
in these areas. To provide an answer to these challenges, some scholars and 
politicians turned to the concept and project of ‘global governance’.26 Others 
withdrew to their Cold War concepts centered on ‘national security’, which by 
definition was an exclusive domain of the state, while the rest was left to the 
‘forces’ of globalization and the market.27 
It is said that the terrorist attacks in the United States of America on 
September 11, 2001, have changed our world and this holds much truth in 
                                                                                                                                               
Century 1914-91, London. This is also in line with Francis Fukuyama’s understanding of his ‘the 
end of history’ argument, see Francis Fukuyama (1992): The End of History and the last Man, 
London. The underlying idea was that an era of intense conflict had come to an end and shown 
that the power of economic markets would make liberal democracy prevail over all other forms 
of government. 
23
 For brief discussions of the term, see Lawrence Freedman (2002): A New Type of War, in: 
Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (eds., 2002): Worlds in Collision. Terror and the Future of Global 
Order, Houndmills, pp. 37-47, and Immanuel Wallerstein (2002): Mr. Bush’s War on Terrorism: 
How Certain is the Outcome?, in: Booth and Dunne (eds., 2002), pp. 95-100. 
24
 For comprehensive discussions of globalization, see David Held and Anthony Mc Grew 
(2003): Global Transformations Reader. An Introduction to the Globalization Debate, Cambridge 
2nd edition, and Eleonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs (2001): Globalization. Theory and 
Practice, London 2nd edition. 
25
 For an analysis of the impact of globalization on the military and warfare, see Mary Kaldor 
(1999): New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era, Cambridge. 
26
 For early influential works, see Commission on Global Governance (1995): Our Global 
Neighborhood. The Report of the Commission on Global Governance, Oxford, and James N. 
Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds., 1992): Governance without government. Order and 
change in world politics, Cambridge. 
27
 A strong critique of this reaction from a security perspective is presented in: Paul Rogers 
(2000): Losing Control. Global Security in the Twenty-first Century, London. 
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many ways, but from a medium-term perspective it makes more sense to see 
the attacks as a catalyst event that has highlighted changes in our world order 
since the end of the Cold War. Now observers of globalization and proponents 
of global governance and national security have all joined again to ask the 
central question: what is the order of the world we live in today? On what power 
and values does it rest? Who are the relevant actors in it?28 
This is such a complex question, that even a broad concept like globalization 
and a holistic approach like ‘global governance’ have not been able to give any 
conclusive answers.29 Indeed, it seems that to most observers the world has 
become too complex to comprehend. Of course, in general, this is no new 
development. Our world has always been complex, not the least because a lot 
depends on the concepts and ideas we use to understand it. To make things 
worse, recently a lot of our traditional concepts have been challenged by 
developments linked to globalization. But there is a common tool available 
through which we can introduce greater clarity into any effort to understand our 
world: we can adopt a certain perspective that tells us which issues matter and 
observe the relevant behavior of actors in it. This is the common mode of 
operation of most social science disciplines and is usually called issue-areas 
and levels of analysis.30 A number of prominent issue-areas can be identified as 
the discussion of the practical meaning of new world order has shown. On a 
more general level, they can be listed as follows: military, political, economic, 
socio-cultural and environmental. As levels of analysis, one can distinguish 
primarily between the global system (here: world order), the social (organized 
groups of individuals) and the individual level.31 
For a political scientist, especially one interested in world politics and world 
order, the most important unit of analysis on the social level is the state. This is 
not only because the state is supposed to embody the highest political authority 
                                                 
28
 See for example: Booth and Dunne (eds., 2002). 
29
 Clark (2001) and see supranote 24. 
30
 Cf. Peter Willets (2001): Transnational Actors and International Organizations in Global 
Politics, in Baylis and Smith (eds., 2001), pp. 356-383 (he calls issue-areas policy domains in 
the context of world politics), and Buzan and Little (2000). 
31
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in our world but also because the activities of the state span to varying degrees 
over all the relevant issue areas that have been listed above. This is also very 
much in line with how most ordinary people would look at the state and its 
relevance in our world. Thus, if we want to understand the world we live in 
today, we can reasonably focus on the role of the state in this world (without 
treating it necessarily as a unitary actor, but more as a basic political concept).32 
Below I will discuss the role of the state, which will finally allow me to turn to the 
question what kind of international intervention matters today and why. 
 
The Continuing Reliance on the State for Projecting World Order 
Despite increased global interdependence and the rise of new concepts and 
transnational actors, the state has remained the dominant concept through 
which we humans project order among ourselves, irrespective of the various 
degrees of realization of the state concept in different parts of the world. Of 
course, the continuing importance of the state does not seem that surprising, 
given that we still primarily think of our world as a system of states. Usually 
each of us relates to at least one of these states (in a positive or negative way) 
and is the citizen of one or more of them. But we have to keep in mind that the 
state has never been a static concept. It can be argued therefore that it is likely 
that the state will continue to remain central to our world order despite claims to 
the contrary.33 This is not to say that our modern state cannot be complemented 
or eventually replaced by other concepts, but it remains to be seen how much 
these would resemble entities throughout history that we have tended to call 
states.34 
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A major problem in the debate on the relevance of the state is that although 
the state is an important social reality in our daily lives and an important concept 
in social sciences, there is little agreement on what exactly a state is or should 
be. Therefore, I do not want to come up with a generally accepted definition but 
outline in what way the state matters today. The state we usually refer to today 
is a distinctively modern concept, less than five hundred years old. 
Nevertheless, we also tend to apply the term in common language to many 
political communities of pre-modern times. For the purpose of clarity, analysts 
often call the latter ones ‘early states’ or ‘proto-states’, to keep them distinct 
form the ‘modern state’.35  
While personal leadership has probably always existed, centralized formal 
leadership and political rule did not evolve before the emergence of larger 
societies more than ten thousand years ago.36 Political analysts who have 
looked at the state in historical perspective have defined it in an abstract way as 
“any form of post-kinship, territorially based, politically centralized self-
government entity capable of generating an inside/outside structure. This broad 
category contains several different historical types”.37 Of course, the concept of 
a politically centralized government is inseparably linked to the concept of the 
state. For this reason we have to ask what government means. Government 
usually refers to a system of rule and control with authority over a certain 
territory. As we will see below, its authority today is primarily based on laws (the 
nation-state also invokes nationalism and other grounds of legitimacy, like 
social welfare). 
Although philosophers, historians, anthropologists and political analysts have 
proposed many theories that tried to explain why the first states emerged, we 
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still know little for certain on this point.38 Probably each case of state formation 
was a combination of some of the factors that different theories suggest, 
because no theory can explain all historic cases of state formation. Population 
growth must count as a major factor in the evolution of a central government 
because kinship ties could not provide an effective order for the increased 
interactions among strangers who were not related by blood or adoption. This 
created in a sense a public sphere that had not existed before and the related 
new complexity and uncertainty in human interactions favored communities that 
developed a hierarchical government to provide certain public goods, such as 
internal order and outside defense.  
It has to be pointed out that for thousands of years, stateless societies and 
societies with different types of states coexisted in our world and this changed 
only rather recently.39 Now almost the whole globe is formally split up into 
territorial entities called states.40 It is important to stress the difference that is 
usually made between the pre-modern and the modern state, because it has 
implications on how we should look at the significance of intervention in our 
current world order. The distinction is not so much made in terms of strength or 
scope of the state but in terms of its legal status, both internally and externally. 
In contrast to its predecessors, the modern state is commonly understood as 
having juridical sovereignty over a territory and its population. Juridical 
sovereignty means that a state claims that there exists no legal (and related 
political) authority that is above it and that it possesses a legal personality of its 
own in relation to other states, “which means that it has rights and duties and 
may engage in various activities as if it were a real, flesh-and-blood, living 
individual.”41 Indeed, a state itself can be authorized internationally only by other 
states through recognition of its sovereignty. Therefore, the state is being 
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understood as an absolute abstract organization, which means that it is not 
seen as being identical with either rulers or ruled. As a further consequence, all 
other human organizations must be authorized by the state if they want to hold 
any rights within that state’s territory. This logic applies to individuals, too, 
except in liberal state theory, where the sovereignty of the state is derived from 
its individual citizens. Along these lines, Max Weber’s famous definition of the 
state provides an abstract analytical concept that we can work with. According 
to Weber, the main feature of the state is its claim of a monopoly on the 
legitimate (i.e. legal) use of physical force within a given territory.42 In 
conclusion, it can be said that the enforcement powers based on legal 
independence within a given territory are the essence of the modern state. 
This is our formal legal concept of the state today and the way it is enshrined 
in international law, the normative framework that is supposed to regulate the 
rights and obligations of states among each other. The Charter of the United 
Nations provides evident example of this formal legal understanding and is of 
special interest to us because it is sometimes called the “constitution of the 
international community”.43 Today, the United Nations has achieved universal 
membership, at least with respect to those states who enjoy full sovereign 
status.44 For our discussion, the most relevant provisions of the United Nations 
Charter are: 
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• “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of 
all its Members [only states].” (Article 2, Paragraph 1) 
• “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of 
the United Nations.” (Article 2, Paragraph 4) 
• “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this 
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures 
under Chapter VII.” (Article 2, Paragraph 7).45 
This has of course important implications for our discussion because from the 
principle of sovereign equality follows a norm of non-intervention. Thus, nothing 
can be imposed on a state unless it has given its prior consent – except any 
enforcement action to maintain international peace and security within the 
United Nation’s collective security system (the given reference to Chapter VII).46 
This leads us to the general meaning of state sovereignty as it is understood by 
traditional international lawyers: “sovereignty equals independence and consists 
of the bundle of competences which have not already been transferred through 
the exercise of independent consent to an international legal order.”47  
Again, one has to keep in mind that this global system of states is a historical 
phenomenon and that the modern sovereign nation-state system has gone 
through several evolutionary steps in the last five hundred years.48 It is a 
popular myth among international lawyers and international relations scholars to 
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assume that this state system was born when the European princes and 
monarchs mutually recognized their sovereign equality in the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648, because the historical record shows that equal sovereignty 
has never been an absolute and static concept, neither legally nor empirically.49 
What is of interest for our considerations on world order is that there is now a 
truly global system which can provide world order, because ultimate power and 
legitimacy are attributed to one unit, the modern state, which covers basically 
the whole globe.50 As pointed out above in the discussion of Bush’s new world 
order, the problem is that this international state-system does neither provide a 
coherent nor hierarchical world order. As Stephen Krasner put it in his study of 
the crucial concept of sovereignty: 
“The muddle in part reflects the fact that the term ‘sovereignty’ has been 
used in different ways, and in part it reveals the failure to recognize that 
the norms and rules of any international institutional system, including 
the sovereign state system, will have limited influence and always be 
subject to challenge because of logical contradictions (nonintervention 
versus promoting democracy, for instance), the absence of any 
institutional arrangement for authoritatively resolving conflicts (the 
definition of an international system), power asymmetries among 
principal actors, notably states, and the differing incentives confronting 
individual rulers. In the international environment actions will not tightly 
conform with any given set of norms regardless of which set is chosen. 
The justification for challenging specific norms may change over time 
but the challenge will be persistent.”51 
Before the 1990s, the deficiencies of the international state-system were 
often neglected because the Cold War and the decolonization movement 
caused most policy-makers and analysts to focus on the formal legal concept of 
the state, which was supplemented by a largely militarized security concept. 
Escalating interstate conflict between military forces with nuclear capabilities 
was seen as the biggest threat to international peace and security. Thus, norms 
of territorial integrity and sovereign equality offered a way to reduce the 
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chances for international conflict between the nuclear powers. Limited military 
and other interventions by the two superpowers, the United States and the 
Soviet Union, were accepted as necessary exceptions to the nonintervention 
norm because they were seen as efforts to keep the balance of power between 
the two military blocs.52 Parallel to the Cold War ran the decolonization 
movement, whose leaders also focused on the formal concept of legal 
sovereignty because it gave them international legitimacy without applying any 
other requirements but to interact with other states on the international level. It 
further allowed them to argue that every state was entitled to have its own 
socio-economic development policies and to oppose the norms of the dominant 
liberal international economic order based on free trade, which they saw as 
discriminatory.53 
In conclusion, before the 1990s, a state was more or less equated with a 
government which could declare its ideological affiliation with one of the two 
superpowers or stress its neutrality; but how a state was governed internally 
was of secondary importance as long as it did not threaten to provoke a direct 
military confrontation between the two superpowers. In this sense, the Cold War 
seemed to provide a rather stable world order based on conflict and 
competition, nuclear deterrence and a balance of power.54  Thus, the formal 
concept of the state focusing on the recognition of juridical sovereignty 
dominated in international relations, although it did hardly reflect the reality of 
world politics.55 This made it possible to treat the state as a unitary actor 
represented through its government. 
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In practice though, real states do not necessarily reflect this unitary image, 
which faces empirical problems. First, governments of states consist of different 
bureaucracies, often with different agendas in foreign policy, like the ministry of 
foreign affairs and the ministry of defence, and parliament often plays a role in 
making crucial decisions in democratic states.56 Further, there have always 
been transnational actors within a state which actively influence or engage in 
world politics.57 Finally, sovereign equality of states was often overruled by 
power differences between states. While states might have been supposed to 
have the same rights and obligations, history has shown that powerful states 
could claim special rights and request special obligations from other states.58 
As already discussed above, the end of the Cold War coincided with the end 
of decolonization and to many it seemed the global state-system would be able 
to provide from now on a stable world order because the whole globe was 
covered by states, whose most effective form of government was, as many 
argued, liberal democracy. But as we have further seen, the focus of world 
politics soon shifted to intrastate wars in the 1990s and this put in doubt the 
state as a concept to provide world order, because some states obviously 
collapsed under internal conflict and outside states could not effectively help to 
prevent or end these internal conflicts.59 The state was also put in doubt by 
policies based on neoliberal economic theory which stressed the market over 
the state and the technological and economic dynamics of globalization, which 
undermined the capacity of the state to deal with transnational actors. Thus, 
some doubts about the usefulness of the state to guarantee world order 
seemed appropriate.  
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But the state has seen a kind of a comeback in the last years because of a 
lack of viable legitimate alternatives for projecting world order.60 It was 
recognized that markets alone cannot effectively function without the state 
providing them with a stable framework of law and order. In the late 1990s, 
economic leaders and analysts came to the conclusion that “institutions matter”. 
Thus, economists have taken a new look at states’ capacity to provide these 
institutions.61 It was further understood that one of the biggest sources of global 
political instability and insecurity were weak, failed and rogue states.62 The 
failure of some states to provide the most basic order internally had negative 
effects on the security of neighboring and far-away states (to name only three 
related aspects: refugee flows, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction). Thus, based on notions of interdependence, the traditional 
military security concept was broadened in the last three decades to cope with 
new transnational threats and actors.63 A prime example of this development 
was the debate on humanitarian interventions that started in the early 1990s 
and the fight against global terrorism. It has thus become the ‘new conventional 
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wisdom’, as Francis Fukuyama put it recently, that strong states and ‘good 
governance’ matter in our world.64 
Political scientists think that the institutions that constitute a strong state can 
be created based on internal demand generated by large parts of the 
population, or at least parts of the elite, or based on external involvement. The 
first option often arises in the context of crises or extraordinary circumstances, 
while the second option usually takes the form of conditional foreign assistance 
or even direct intervention in the internal affairs of a state and its society.65 The 
problem with the external involvement is that it might not be successful without 
internal demand and that we simply cannot transfer institutions and knowledge 
that work in one place to another place that has a different cultural and historical 
background.66 Or as Fukyuma expressed it, “Formal rules can be readily 
changed as a matter of public policy; cultural rules cannot, and while they 
chance over time, it is much harder to direct their development.”67 This problem 
is of course aggravated in weak, failed or rogue states because either the state 
cannot or does not want to create an internal culture that promotes security for 
its own people and other people around the world. In those states, even indirect 
and passive intervention like conditional foreign assistance and sanctions, not 
to mention other traditional modes of diplomatic influence, often seem to be a 
bad tool to bring about change. 
For all these reasons, direct active intervention has often become a preferred 
instrument in world politics and authors of intervention are required to assume 
direct authority in other societies, to an extent unparalleled since the end of 
colonialism and the ideological struggle of the Cold War. These latter two 
political associations and the current universality of the principle of state 
sovereignty pose a political and moral dilemma for authors of intervention. The 
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authors have to come up with an answer on how they want to reconcile their 
undertaking with the peoples’ right to self-determination and the principle of 
state sovereignty – which is supposed to secure world order, the very some 
goal that the authors eventually have to claim as the legitimate basis of their 
state-building intervention. 
We can thus conclude that the state has long been an important concept in 
human history to project order in our world, especially since the modern state 
with its claim of the monopoly of the legal use of physical force within a given 
territory emerged and spread around the globe. But as so many times in history, 
its terms of reference have changed. Now it increasingly matters how a state is 
governed internally because it can threaten not only the security of its own 
people but that of other states as well. It is argued that a stable and more 
secure world order requires strong states, at least with respect to some core 
state functions. State-building, the “creation of new government institutions and 
the strengthening of existing ones”68, became one of the key issues in world 
politics. We have to evaluate the question of international intervention against 
this background and I will show below that since the end of the Cold War most 
interventions aimed in one way or another at state-building.  
 
3. The Debate on Intervention: The Need to Focus on State-Building 
The Gaps in the Debate on International Intervention 
After the end of the Cold War, intervention became one of the key topics of 
world politics, as it is reflected in the evergrowing literature on intervention and 
the debate on various ongoing, past or possible interventions. This should not 
be surprising because it should have become clear by now that providing an 
answer to the question “who will intervene where, when, how and for what 
purpose?” will reveal much about the world we live in today. Who is the 
international community if there is any? How does it decide what is a weak or 
failed state and what a rogue state? What are the sovereign rights and duties 
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that are currently attributed to a state? Who holds or claims political authority 
(legitimacy) and control (power) in the world we live in? 
Below I want to outline the main events and the key points of the debate on 
intervention. I will argue that we still lack a coherent comparative analysis of the 
political processes underlying the interventions since the end of the Cold War. I 
will further argue that state-building intervention has become the most crucial 
and challenging form of intervention – in a sense it has also become the most 
common form of intervention and can be used as concept to understand 
international interventions in general in our post-Cold War era. 
One main problem of international intervention is that it has always been 
intimately connected to the question of world order and that it has always been 
around in different forms. As one observer put it some thirty years ago, 
“Intervention has been a recurrent feature of the history of international politics. 
It has not, however, been a constant or unchanging phenomenon.”69 As a 
result, there is much confusion about what exactly constitutes an international 
intervention. For the moment, I do not intend to clarify the concept of 
intervention, this will follow later, but I want to show the reader how intervention 
has always been a feature in the history of the modern states-system.  
As I stated above, despite the symbolic value of the Peace of Westphalia for 
the creation of a European states-system that was based on sovereign equality, 
there have of course always been differences between more powerful and 
weaker states.70 While the Peace of Westphalia took away religion as a reason 
to go to war between Catholic and Protestant princes and states, states still had 
the sovereign right to go to war for other reasons (e.g. dynastic claims and 
territorial aggrandizement). This was even more so because the two Treaties of 
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the Peace of Westphalia envisioned a first collective security system, declaring 
that “the peace concluded shall remain in force and that all parties to it ‘shall be 
obliged to defend and protect every article of this peace against anyone, without 
distinction of religion’.”71 Although this collective security system was never 
implemented, it would remain a powerful idea and much reference would be 
made to it, including using it as a legitimate basis for intervention.  
Along similar lines, later treaties made references to peace that could serve 
as justification for intervention. One famous example is the Peace of Utrecht in 
1713, in which England, France and Spain acknowledged the “Maxim of 
securing for ever the universal Good and Quiet of Europe, by equal weight of 
Power, so that many being united in one, the Balance of the Equality desired, 
might not turn to the Advantage of one, and the Danger and Hazard of the 
Rest.”72 But the most famous treaties of this type were concluded around the 
time of the Vienna Congress at the end of the Napoleonic Wars.73 They created 
a system of congresses between the Great Powers, the ‘Concert of Europe’, to 
secure peace.74 The Concert was supplemented by the so-called ‘Holy 
Alliance’, which was an effort by the rulers of the conservative empires to 
preserve the old social order against the liberal ideas which had been spreading 
since the French Revolution.75 The Alliance was based on a vague agreement 
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that the European sovereigns should act in accordance with Christian 
principles. Like the Congress System, the Alliance eventually failed to provide 
peace and stability in Europe, but both arrangements allowed the Great Powers 
to conduct interventions in weaker states. 
Thus, it can be claimed that there have always been tensions in the legal 
order of the European states-system at least since 1815, if not earlier, because 
the Great Powers would claim special rights and duties running contrary to the 
idea of sovereign equality. Even in those times during the 19th century when the 
European states seemed to respect each other’s equal sovereignty, they could 
do so because they intervened and competed as colonial powers in non-
European areas.76 One analyst of the international legal order put it this way: 
“These Great Powers occupy a position of authority within each of the 
legal regimes that has arisen since 1815. Sometimes these regimes are 
constructed around loose affiliations of interested Great Powers (the 
Vienna Congress), at other times the roles of the Great Powers is laid 
out in the detailed provisions of an originating document (the United 
Nations Charter). In each instance, these powers have policed the 
international order from a position of assumed cultural, material and 
legal superiority. A key prerogative of this position has been a right to 
intervene in the affairs of other states in order to promote some 
proclaimed community goal.”77 
Recalling our discussion on the modern state, we can conclude that the legal 
principle of sovereign equality only received its absolute character when it was 
combined with a general prohibition on the use of force in the United Nations 
Charter. The latter norm came up in the late 19th and early 20th century and was 
made the cornerstone of the United Nations Charter, resulting in the norm of 
nonintervention (article 2, paragraphs 4 and 7).78 But as we have also already 
seen, the norm of nonintervention was never fully observed for political reasons 
during the Cold War, indeed, “The Cold War is largely a long and complicated 
intervention story.”79 Geopolitical and ideo-political reasons even affected the 
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decolonization movement and were used as justification by developing states to 
intervene among each other.80 Thus, the end of the Cold War raised the 
question whether intervention would become less or more likely, now that the 
ideo-political superpower competition was gone. 
Contrary to the Cold War, it is difficult to write a comprehensive and 
concluding history of the post-Cold War interventions yet. Even if one would 
accept September 11, 2001, as the date of a transition to a new era, the ‘war on 
terror’, many pre-September 11 interventions are still not concluded. Therefore 
one should be careful to treat September 11 as a hard point of transition and 
rather put it in a medium-term perspective, focusing on the continuities in our 
post-Cold War world. With the new unipolar international system, a debate 
started whether it would be a new empire, the United States, which would rule 
the world, or whether the world would finally form an international community 
represented and governed through the United Nations.81 The U.S.-led 
multilateral intervention that repulsed the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait and 
U.S. President George H.W. Bush's related “new world order”, were only the 
beginning of the debate. The subsequent failure of the United Nations and its 
individual member states, including its most capable one, the United States, to 
develop a coherent policy with respect to interventions, led to new regional and 
global initiatives, increasing the complexity of the debate on intervention.  
What followed after the Cold War was what some cynics called the “new 
world disorder”. While it was possible to end some long-standing violent 
conflicts, for example in Central America, Cambodia, Namibia, Mozambique 
and South Africa through monitoring peace agreements and assisting in 
democratization, other conflicts, for example Angola and Afghanistan, exposed 
a more complex and intractable nature when the cover of the Cold War was 
lifted and the former ‘proxy wars’ could not be explained through superpower 
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rivalries anymore. The renewed mixture of nationalism with the principle of self-
determination led to the collapse of two big Socialist federations, the Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia, causing much violent conflict in Europe, the Caucasus 
and Central Asia. In Africa, meanwhile, some states still had to struggle with 
their colonial legacies and weak state structures. New civil wars broke out in 
such weak states and those wars were able to sustain themselves without being 
fed by superpower rivalries. This happened for example in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone. “Ethnic conflict” became the new term that dominated the international 
debate.82 
The international security framework was ill-adapted to deal with such 
internal conflicts after its long focus on interstate war. The principle of state 
sovereignty under international law and the lack of strategic interest by powerful 
states hampered any decisive peace-enforcing interventions at the periphery of 
the developed world. The United Nations tried to deal with this problem. In 
1992, the UN Secretariat under Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
drafted an “Agenda for Peace”, proposing policy tools for maintaining peace and 
security in the new post-Cold War world.83 The policy document included 
besides traditional peacekeeping, which was conducted with the consent of all 
parties concerned, a new type of peacekeeping based on enforcement actions 
under Chapter VII. It included further the concepts of peace-building and 
preventive diplomacy. These concepts provided the basis for what some 
observers called the “new interventionism” of the United Nations.84 The 
traditional international legal framework was stretched more and more to cover 
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intrastate conflicts and UN peace missions increased in number and size at an 
unprecedented level.85 
The rise in peace operations was based on two developments. First, some 
warring parties did not trust each other and requested international supervision 
of the implementation of their peace agreements. Secondly, the humanitarian 
catastrophe of such brutal and bloody ethnic conflicts was brought into the 
homes of a growing global TV audience (‘CNN factor’), creating moral public 
pressure (NGOs have a prominent role here) on politicians to do something to 
stop or alleviate the suffering.86 The latter was the case in Bosnia and Somalia. 
Those missions started as a primarily humanitarian mission that was later 
expanded to cover peace enforcement goals. U.S. military leaders have coined 
the term “mission creep” for such expanding missions (often in reference to 
Vietnam).87 When the mission in Somalia turned into a bloody debacle for the 
American forces supporting the UN mission in 1993, other generals spoke of 
the “Mogadishu Line”, beyond which peacekeeping becomes open war.88 
The Somalia fiasco led to a withdrawal of the United States from UN 
peacekeeping missions and was followed by the failures of the UN missions in 
Rwanda and Bosnia (especially Srebrenica).89 These failures damaged the 
legitimacy of the United Nations’ peace operations dramatically and, as a 
reaction, the United Nations Secretariat established in 1995 the ‘Lessons-
Learned Unit’ (today it is called ‘Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit’ or PBPU) at 
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the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.90 Another result of these failures 
was that new approaches to intervention were developed. Actually, the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) had already acted in 
such a fashion earlier. When the Security Council had failed to deal with the civil 
war in Liberia in 1990, ECOWAS sent, without legally required Security Council 
authorization, a peacekeeping force (ECOMOG) to enforce an armistice there. 
Similarly, NATO under U.S.-leadership began to act more and more 
independently in Europe, as the intervention in Bosnia in 1995 and in Kosovo in 
1999 showed. Especially the latter intervention was very problematic because it 
was not originally covered by a mandate of the Security Council. The 
intervention in East Timor in 1999 was also initiated by a regional coalition, 
although it remained within the UN framework. 
Some people questioned whether from now on peace would be enforced 
through regional organizations or the sole remaining superpower, the United 
States, instead of the United Nations (which might just authorize but not 
implement the intervention).91 Since then, the European Union has made efforts 
to develop its own intervention capabilities and so has the African Union.92 
While it can be argued that the credibility of United Nations peace missions has 
been restored to a considerable degree by now, especially through missions 
like East Timor and Sierra Leone (with massive British help), but also through 
internal reform efforts such as the ‘Brahimi Report’93, it is also true that the 
Security Council’s legal monopoly to authorize and conduct interventions has 
been undermined.94 The post-September 11 U.S.-led interventions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have just further highlighted this point. 
                                                 
90
 United Nations (1995): Comprehensive Report on Lessons-Learned from United Nations 
Operation in Somalia, April 1992-March 1995, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Germany; Life and 
Peace Institute, Sweden; Norwegian Institute of International Affairs; in Cooperation with the 
Lessons-Learned Unit of the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations, New York. 
91
 Michael Hirsh (2000): Calling all Regio-Cops. Peacekeeping’s Hybrid Future, in: Foreign 
Affairs 79, pp. 2-8. 
92
 Michael C. Pugh and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu (eds., 2003): The United Nations & Regional 
Security. Europe and Beyond, Boulder CO. 
93
 United Nations (2000): Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi 
Report), New York NY, UN Document A/55/505 and S/2000/809 of 21 August 2000. 
94
 Cf. Malone (ed., 2004). 
 31
Since Kosovo 1999, there have been efforts by coalitions of states to justify 
interventions on humanitarian grounds and self-defence, if the Security Council 
would not authorize them. It is hardly questioned that self-defence understood 
in the traditional way can provide a legal basis for intervention, but humanitarian 
grounds are more contested. This is why United Nations Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan had called for a debate on humanitarian intervention in 1999 and the 
Canadian government answered it by sponsoring an international expert panel 
on this question, which produced the report ‘Responsibility to Protect’.95 
Recently the doctrine of preemptive self-defence of the administration of U.S. 
President George W. Bush has stirred new controversy because it expands the 
traditional understanding of self-defence.96 In sum, the complex debate will 
continue. 
From this short historical outline of major interventions and key points of the 
debate on intervention since the end of the Cold War, we can see what a 
complex and confusing level the discussion on intervention has reached. This is 
also reflected in the plethora of literature that has been published on this topic.97 
The complexity and confusion is aggravated by the fact that much of the 
literature consists of single case studies or on fragmented analyses of the 
“lessons learned”. Furthermore, much of the debate (including recently on 
humanitarian intervention) has focused on policies for intervention that different 
schools of political philosophy prescribe98 and it can be argued that international 
legal studies fall into this category as well.99 
While all these studies are valuable, they are not sufficient and have to be 
complemented by comprehensive comparative case studies to introduce more 
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clarity into the general debate on intervention. But there have been a number of 
important thematic comparative case studies that have been more interested in 
the operational complexities of intervention and I can draw from those for my 
discussion. While they might still adopt a certain perspective and not 
necessarily focus explicitly on intervention, their nature is general enough to 
contribute to a more comprehensive discussion of intervention in our post-Cold 
War World. Of particular value are comparative or general studies of peace 
negotiations and implementation100, United Nations peace operations101, 
international administrations, state-building, post-conflict reconstruction and 
democratization.102 
Despite of these available comparative studies, I want to argue that we still 
lack a coherent comparative analysis of the political processes underlying 
interventions103, because I am convinced that who will intervene where, when, 
how and for what purpose, is an inherently political question that will be decided 
differently from case to case, not the least because it will depend on the 
perceptions, values and beliefs of those persons who have the authority and 
power to order an intervention on behalf of the state or organization they 
lead.104 Thus, a general theory of international interventions is of little use and 
other scholars have failed to produce a generally accepted one. What is more 
useful is to produce generalizations on the political challenge that current 
interventions pose to decision-makers and analysts alike. 
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Although it has become commonly accepted that state sovereignty is not an 
absolute principle, it is most contested when the norm of non-intervention is 
overruled. The question whether and how to intervene has become so complex 
that the prescriptive studies of political philosophical schools do not provide 
decision-makers with final answers. As two scholars put it recently, “Political 
scientists, policy analysts, and philosophers have found no dearth of words in 
addressing the issue of whether and under what circumstances intervention is 
the appropriate solution to the dilemma posed by a collision between the values 
of local sovereignty and international responsibility.”105 The problem is that the 
decision to intervene is not the final stage but just the beginning of a process. 
This is what the implementation literature is concerned with. 
Analysts have called for coherent intervention strategies but at the same time 
they had to admit that any intervention is a product of political negotiation and 
compromise.106 This has always been the case, but it can be argued that it has 
become more difficult in the past decade. As a result of the end of the Cold 
War, competitive interventions between the superpowers were replaced by 
interventions which take rather the form of joint-problem exercises or 
cooperative interventions. This in turn has brought in a growing numbers of 
actors in each intervention, covering different tasks, sometimes with overlapping 
areas of responsibility and authority. This development has required more 
coordination among the different actors, a considerable challenge in itself, 
irrespective of the difficulty of the situation they intervene in.107 This challenge is 
multiplied by the fact that interventions have grown into truly multidimensional 
undertakings because they have to deal with the limited resources available, the 
complex nature of internal conflicts and the uncertainties of the new world order. 
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If any intervention is the result of political negotiation and compromise, we 
should not focus so much on when and how they ought to take place, but the 
processes that make them happen or not and that lead them to success or 
failure. We can thus establish that no intervention is a linear event whose 
effectiveness could be measured based on the compliance with the agreement 
that provided for the intervention (peace agreement, resolution or declaration). 
Two analysts of peace implementation processes found that “[i]n order to 
reserve the capacity to flexibly adapt to these changing conditions [of 
implementation], planers want mandates to be more ambiguous than they might 
be in a simpler more traditional mission.”108 As a result, constant and extensive 
post-agreement negotiations are required to secure a continued international 
engagement until all problems that hinder the achievement of the intervention’s 
goal are overcome.  
I want to argue that if we analyze in a coherent and comprehensive way the 
political decision-making processes of past international interventions, we can 
learn a lot more about where the debate on international interventions is leading 
us and how future international interventions might look like. This can also serve 
as basis for policy advice to decision-makers and provide additional insights for 
analysts on what constitutes our current world order. To achieve this, I want to 
propose a model of analysis of regimes of state-building interventions that will 
be able to produce such useful generalizations on the political processes that 
are underlying interventions. But first I will explain why I think that a focus on 
state-building interventions will tell us much about post-Cold War interventions 
in general. 
 
State-building intervention as the key challenge for maintaining world order 
As outlined above, the state is still the most important concept to project 
order in our world and as a consequence it is still states, or better coalitions of 
states (also as members of international organizations), that intervene in other 
states. Do these intervening states represent the international community if 
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there is any? How do these states decide what a weak or failed state is and 
what a rogue state? How is the tension between intervention and sovereign 
equality reconciled, especially given that there is no central hierarchical 
structure within or above the states-system. What are the sovereign rights and 
duties that are currently attributed to a state? Who holds or claims political 
authority (legitimacy) and control (power) in the world we live in? Which actors 
influence the decisions of states to intervene? 
Before I can propose a way to answer all these questions related to our 
current world order, I have to determine what I mean when I talk about 
intervention. Intervention has been used in so many ambiguous and 
contradictory ways, that as a result, “intervention has come to be treated as 
synonymous with influence.”109 Along similar lines, the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) recently remarked, 
“[t]he actual meaning of the term ‘intervention’ can be derived from the contexts 
in which it occurs, in addition to the purposes for which it is invoked.”110 The 
ICISS’ discussion of intervention is a good guide on the topic. But I do not want 
to adopt the Commission’s own definition, because it ultimately rests on one 
specific purpose of intervention, which it defines as “action taken against a state 
or its leaders, without its or their consent, for purposes which are claimed to be 
humanitarian or protective.”111 This limitation of purpose is no surprise, because 
the Commission’s goal was to discuss “humanitarian intervention” – a term it 
avoids in its discussion for political reasons. Instead it refers in its definition to 
the terms “humanitarian purpose” and “protective purpose”. The former means 
assisting people at risk and latter protecting people at risk.112  
I want to work with the broader definition that the Commission also came up 
with, defining intervention as “various forms of nonconsensual action that are 
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thought to directly challenge the principle of state sovereignty”.113 This is a 
useful general definition but we need to discuss its aspects to understand it. As 
one scholar put it, “The criteria for an operational definition seem plain. It must 
be broad enough to identify those phenomena that are generally associated 
with the term and yet not so broad that it fails to discriminate them from other 
aspects of international politics.”114 Thus, it should be both, relevant and 
precise. Further, two basic and interrelated distinctions have to be made with 
respect to intervention: first, the distinction between the common-sense and 
operational meanings of intervention, and second, the distinction between 
intervention as an empirical phenomenon and an analytic concept.115 The short 
narrative of intervention in the modern states-system indicated already many 
ways the term intervention is used. As a result, facing various forms of the use 
of the term intervention in daily language, “the political analyst must be 
especially conscious of the technical meanings he ascribes to [intervention].”116 
The ordinary dictionary meaning of intervention is ‘to interfere’ but this has to be 
put in the context of the ‘states-system’. 
The criteria of the above given general definition of the ICISS are helpful but 
we need to discuss their meaning because they are not unproblematic. The 
criterion “various forms of nonconsensual action” should be understood as to 
refer to “organized and systematic activities”, excluding “haphazard and 
inadvertent activities”.117 This is rather implicit in the above given definition but 
refers back to what the ICISS had observed before and what has been stated 
above – authors of intervention will claim certain purposes. The term 
“nonconsensual action” is more problematic because it is difficult in reality to 
draw a sharp line between persuasion (voluntary consent) and coercion (forced 
consent). The question is then who can make an authoritative judgment on the 
nature of a particular action. This is where “thought to directly challenge the 
principle of state sovereignty” points to a practical answer on this question. But 
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even this phrase does not provide us with an obvious answer, because who is 
going to decide how it is going to be applied? 
In my discussion of the relevance of the state in our world, I have already 
made reference to international law and the United Nations as the prescriptive 
normative framework for interstate relations. Thus, an intervention is obviously 
any action running contrary to principle of sovereign equality and the principle of 
nonintervention as it is defined in the Charter and understood in the practice of 
the member states of the United Nations.118 Unfortunately, while the legal 
framework on intervention is rather clear, its application is not. The International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) summarized the legal debate on intervention the following 
way in the so-called Nicaragua Case: 
“the principle [of non-intervention] forbids all states or groups of states to 
intervene directly or indirectly in internal or external affairs of other states. 
A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in 
which each state is permitted, by the principle of state sovereignty, to 
decide freely. One of these is the choice of a political, economic, social 
and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy. Intervention is 
wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, 
which must remain free ones. The element of coercion, which define and 
indeed forms the very essence of prohibited intervention, is particularly 
obvious in the case of an intervention which uses force, whether in the 
direct form of military action, or in the indirect form of support for 
subversive or terrorist activities within another state.”119 
Thus, in a legal sense, coercion is the defining aspect of intervention, 
although certain aims or results add additional weight. Thus, it seems we are 
back at square one in the debate of the ICISS’s general definition, because it 
again comes down to nonconsensual actions. The ICJ included indirect forms of 
interventions. As one scholar interpreted the statement of the ICJ, he said that 
this reflects the “new consensus about an enlarged concept of intervention 
under general international law”.120 The classical international law definition of 
intervention was a rather narrow one and the term “had been most commonly 
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defined as ‘dictatorial interference’, thus implying the necessary presence of a 
use of force or similar form of ‘imperative pressure’.”121 In general it is legally 
accepted that any legitimate government can invite outside assistance. But if it 
does so while it is involved in an internal conflict, then it can only do so if the 
conflict is below the level of civil war. This begs the question who decides which 
government is legitimate and how to classify each particular conflict. Of course, 
different perceptions can exist on what one particular action might represent – a 
certain action might represent assistance for the recipient government and the 
donor state, but the opposition or other states might see it as intervention.  
As the discussion of the importance of the state in today’s world showed, 
state sovereignty can have different meanings but the one most commonly 
invoked is international juridical sovereignty.122 Based on the concept of 
international legal sovereignty, I propose the following new narrow approach to 
conceptualizing intervention as direct intervention in order to be able to 
operationalize the concept for analysis. According to juridical sovereignty, a 
state has the legal right to invite or consent to other states or international 
organizations (or even companies) taking up certain functions within its territory. 
The resulting involvement of outside actors would not be considered as an 
intervention unless the invitation was the result of previous coercion by outside 
actors and/or the effects of the action violate the concept of state sovereignty 
because the outside actors can, based on the intervention/invitation, directly 
impose decisions within the government authority structure of that state. Thus, if 
outside actors get involved without having exercised coercion and they do not 
assume at least part of direct government authority, we should talk of influence 
instead of intervention. Coercive measures falling short of direct physical 
enforcement measures within the territory of the target state and therefore do 
not directly affect the government authority structure of the target state should 
be called indirect intervention. If outside actors have the authority and power to 
enforce decisions affecting directly government authority structures, then we 
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should talk about direct intervention. Each possible case has to be checked on 
its particular circumstances to see if it qualifies as a direct intervention, the kind 
of intervention I am interested from now on. 
My approach can be complemented by another approach that stresses the 
two commonly accepted characteristics of intervention, first, its ‘convention-
breaking nature’, that means a “form of behavior [that] constitutes a sharp break 
with then-existing forms”, and secondly, its ‘authority-oriented nature’, that 
means an action that is directed at changing or preserving the structure of 
political authority in the target society”.123 These two characteristics can actually 
be applied to the general definition above, but let us first elaborate on the first 
characteristic: 
“The first of these characteristics highlights widespread agreement on the 
finite and transitory nature of interventions. Virtually all the historical cases 
cited in the literature are conceived to have a beginning (when the 
conventional modes of conduct are abandoned) and an end (when the 
conventional modes of conduct are restored or the convention-breaking 
mode becomes conventional through persistent use). Their consequences 
for the target society may be profound and enduring, but once the 
consequences become accepted and established, the behavior is no 
longer regarded as interventionary even if the presence of the intervening 
actor in the target society remains undiminished.”124 
Of course, the problem remains in the sense that it is “not necessarily self-
evident when a conventional mode of behavior has been broken, or when the 
unconventional behavior has persisted long enough to have established a new 
convention.”125 But if we now relate these two characteristics to the above 
general definition, we can see how it can help us interpreting the criterion “that 
are thought to directly challenge the principle of state sovereignty”. 
Thus, intervention today challenges the conventional understanding of state 
sovereignty and aims at the political authority structure of the target society as it 
is defined by state sovereignty. This is actually also a way to deal with the 
“various forms of nonconsensual action” criterion, because some intervention 
come about through invitation, that means the effected society or state might 
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originally have given its consent for outside actors to assume authority within 
their society or territory. What matters is that later on, the affected society does 
not need to or cannot consent anymore to the actions of those outside actors it 
has invited. It should be noted that today wars of conquest or over disputed 
territory are not considered intervention because they not only challenge directly 
the principle of state sovereignty but can threaten the very existence of a state. 
In line with my discussion of intervention above, we can therefore adopt a 
narrow interpretation of the general definition of intervention as it was proposed 
by the ICISS and I understand intervention as direct intervention into the 
government authority of another state. This interpretation is also useful because 
certain forms of indirect intervention, like economic or diplomatic sanctions, 
have become more generally accepted because they in turn can be justified 
through state sovereignty or are regulated through international organizations 
and treaty regimes, such as the International Monetary Fund for fiscal policies, 
the World Trade Organization for trade policies and the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations for diplomacy. Unfortunately, there is no time here to 
discuss the interesting issue of indirect intervention further in this paper. 
Accordingly, in my understanding “various forms of nonconsensual action 
that are thought to directly challenge the principle of state sovereignty” means 
that an intervention has to be an action that through its nature and effects 
challenges directly the government authority structure of the affected state 
because some outside actors temporarily take over functions that are usually 
performed by a state’s government. This definition covers several forms of 
intervention, like humanitarian intervention, peace-enforcement, peace-
maintenance, state-building and regime change. 
Now we can put this analytical concept of intervention into our post-Cold War 
context as I have discussed it earlier and conclude that the most crucial and 
challenging intervention is state-building intervention because it challenges 
directly the principle of state sovereignty, although it claims to ultimately serve 
this principle. In a sense, state-building intervention has also become the most 
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common form of intervention and can be used as concept to understand 
international interventions in general in our post-Cold War era, as the list of 
cases on first glance will show below. State-building promises to be the most 
effective and ultimate tool to address the many problems we face in our world 
order but its very nature, affecting directly state sovereignty, and complexity 
poses a major challenge to decision-makers who want to or have to intervene. 
I propose this definition of state-building intervention: A state-building 
intervention is any action through which states or international organizations 
establish and maintain a partial or full transitional authority within a state or 
state-like entity in order to allow that entity to eventually exercise full state 
sovereignty as defined by the international community. Let me now explain the 
crucial elements of this definition. 
First, I want to outline how the term state-building relates to other common 
terms that one can find in the literature on interventions. State-building is 
synonymous with ‘nation-building’ but the latter is rather a misnomer, because it 
means actually state-building.126 The notion of the ‘nation-state’ is the 
underlying reason for that misnomer. The terms ‘peace-building’ and ‘peace-
maintenance’ are in practical terms largely synonymous with state-building, 
because the purpose of state-building is usually centred on strengthening state 
capacity as a means for maintaining peace.127 This can also be called “post-
conflict reconstruction”, which usually aims at public institutions after a violent 
conflict.128 But ‘peace-building’ and the other terms can of course be understood 
in a broader way, not only aiming at the state as a means to provide peace but 
at other social organizations and individuals as well. Again, a similar approach 
can also be applied to ‘democratization’, which can be largely synonymous with 
state-building in practical terms because the most common first threshold of 
democratization are elections organized by the state – although this is of course 
                                                 
126
 von Hippel (2000), p. 10; and Fukuyama (2004), pp. 134-135. 
127
 Cf. Roland Paris (2004): At War’s End. Building Peace After Conflict, Cambridge; and Jarat 
Chopra (1998): Introducing Peace-Maintenance, in: Global Governance 4, pp. 1-18. 
128
 Cf. Orr (2004). 
 42
not the final indicator, if we remember the debate that culture can play with 
respect to public institutions.129 
In line with the general understanding of intervention that I have adopted 
above, intervention does not cover simple monitoring, verification, mediation, 
etc., but some direct exercise of government authority. Its effects must be to 
“establish and maintain a partial or full transitional authority” because otherwise 
it would represent either territorial conquest or colonial rule. Intervention can 
thus be synonymous with invasion and occupation if it aims at state-building 
and not conquest or establishing a protectorate. Authority refers to any 
constitutional function that usually the government of a state would exercise, 
including the right to make decisions in one or more areas and to enforce them. 
In this respect “any action” can mean actions like military, law enforcement, 
setting-up elections, drafting laws on various issues, etc. The authority can be 
partial or full because it can cover only a certain territory within a state or 
different degrees of authority over policy domains (e.g. public security).  
With respect to the authors of an intervention, I include both states and 
international organizations to reflect the obvious practice of the post-Cold War 
World. The authors of an intervention can be identified through the offices that 
embody this transitional authority, their source of authority and political 
guidance. In the case of the most prominent international organization in this 
area, the United Nations, it is usually that the Secretary-General is authorized 
by Security Council to establish the mission conducting the intervention. The 
Security Council also provides the exact mandate of that kind of intervention. In 
other cases, different sources of authority and guidance are possible. For 
example, combinations of authority shared between the United Nations, 
regional organization, ad hoc coalitions of states, or simply unilateral exercise of 
authority by one state. 
I include not only states in the definition but also state-like entities because it 
allows to cover Namibia, Western Sahara and East Timor, which were post-
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colonial territories occupied/annexed by another state and had never reached 
sovereign status before. This also applies to Kosovo, which was a territorial 
entity within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now: Serbia and Montenegro) 
and has never reached sovereign status before and it is still the official position 
that it might never do so. The phrase “in order to allow that entity [state or state-
like entity] to eventually exercise full state sovereignty as defined by the 
international community” is obviously a very ambiguous formulation but this was 
my intention. It is supposed to make clear that it is up to the international 
community (primarily the authors of the intervention, but also the wider state 
community where it was not a legally unproblematic intervention by a coalition 
of states) to decide when that criteria is met. The criteria might be stated either 
in terms of some open-ended broad goals or some clearly specified conditions. 
Below you find a list of all cases of post-Cold War interventions which 
seem to fit at first glance my definition of state-building intervention (see Table 
1). It covers most of the well debated cases of intervention. It does not include a 
number of famous international peace operations, though, for example El 
Salvador, Angola and Mozambique. The reason is that although the scope and 
complexity of these missions and the involvement of international actors in 
these missions surpassed traditional peace-keeping operations, they did not 
have any authority to interfere directly with the government authority structure of 
those states. They only had a mandate to influence the negotiations between 
the conflict parties through monitoring, verification, mediation, providing 
assistance and making recommendations. 
The table also excludes cases were military enforcement action was taken 
for humanitarian and peace-making purposes only, that means, where no 
intention existed to strengthen the institutions of the respective state. This 
excludes for example UNPROFOR in Bosnia (before the Dayton Peace 
Accords). Another case not covered is an all out civil war with foreign forces on 
both sides, as it has been taking place in much of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo in the last years. Although this case obviously constitutes a form of direct 
intervention on both sides of the conflict, it is not directly aimed at state-building 
but more at political and territorial control and is rather a competitive interstate 
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intervention of the traditional style. I do not claim that my list is complete yet, 
Table 1: Post-Cold War Cases covered by the Definition of State-Building Intervention* 
Target (Mission) Time Aspects of Direct Intervention Status 
Namibia (UN) 1989-90 each step had to be done to the satisfaction of the UN 
Secretary-General's Special Representative – veto 
power 
completed-
success 
Panama (US) 1989-90 US unilateral intervention aimed at regime change and 
democratization 
completed – 
success 
Lebanon (Syria) 1989- Ta’if Agreement 1989; Syrian Army to assist in helping 
Lebanese army to extend the state’s authority; later 
Syrian reinterpretation 
ongoing – 
success close 
Liberia I (ECOWAS and UN) 1990-93 ECOWAS enforced armistice, later joined by UN 
mission (until 1997) 
completed-
success 
Western Sahara (UN) 1991- “the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
would have sole and exclusive responsibility over all 
matters relating to a referendum” 
ongoing –
failure so far 
Cambodia (UN) 1992-93 Paris Agreements 1991, United Nations “all powers 
necessary” to ensure the implementation of the 
Agreements, 1992-93 
completed-
success 
Somalia (UN) 1992 from protecting humanitarian assistance to 
establishing a “secure environment”; declared goal of 
nation-building was never achieved 
abandoned- 
failure 
Rwanda (UN) 1993-94 Arusha Accords 1993, “Neutral International Force” to 
“Guarantee the overall security of the country” 
abandoned –
failure 
Haiti I (UN) 1994-2000 “sustaining a secure and stable environment” for 
elections, several successor missions, scaled down to 
assisting an guiding police” 
completed – 
success  
Bosnia-Herzegovina II (NATO, UN, 
etc.) 
1995- complex international implementation authority 
structure based on Dayton Accords 
ongoing – 
uncertain 
Eastern Slavonia (Croatia) (UN) 1995-98 full blown executive authority, to prepare reintegration 
of region into Croatia 
completed - 
success 
Central African Republic 
(Regional and UN) 
1997-2000 MISAB – force of Central African states, supplemented 
by MINURCA UN-mission; also French initially 
involved; providing security in capital area, later assist 
elections 
completed – 
success 
Kosovo (NATO and UN) 1999- UNMIK: full blown authority ongoing – 
uncertain 
East Timor (regional and UN) 1999-2002 UNTAET: full blown authority completed – 
success 
Sierra Leone (ECOWAS, UN and 
Britain) 
1999-  “to assist the efforts of the Government of Sierra 
Leone to extend its authority, restore law and order 
and stabilize the situation progressively throughout the 
entire country”; have to take into account previous 
ECOMOG mission and later British intervention force 
ongoing – 
success close 
Afghanistan (U.S.-led coalition, 
ISAF) 
2001- ensure enviroment although in limited territory, also 
UN presence and US-led coalition fighting Taliban and 
Al-Qaida 
ongoing – 
uncertain 
Iraq (U.S.-led coalition) 2003- after US-led ‘Coalition Provisional Authority’, now 
coalition troops left for providing security 
ongoing – 
uncertain 
Haiti II (UN) 2004- “to ensure a secure and stable environment” ongoing – 
uncertain 
Burundi (UN) 2004-  “ensuring a secure environment for free, transparent 
and peaceful elections to take place” 
ongoing – 
uncertain 
 
* This is a list of cases assembled at first glance. It does not claim to be comprehensive yet. It is based on Information gained 
through a quick review of UN-mandated missions and general knowledge. More comprehensive research is necessary to 
authoritatively complete this list. 
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because more research is required for that, but I think it already includes the 
most prominent cases. 
I now want to argue that we can learn a lot more about the political processes 
of intervention if we treat each of these cases of state-building intervention as 
an international regime and apply a model or regime analysis. The model will 
allow us to account on a comparative basis and in a comprehensive and 
coherent way for the political processes underlying all of these interventions. 
 
4. Introducing Regime Analysis: Regimes of State-Building Intervention130 
Closing the analytical gap through regime analysis 
I want to show that is useful to treat interventions as international regimes 
and how it can help us to close the analytical gap of the debate on international 
intervention as I have outlined it above. Regime analysis allows us to focus on 
the political processes underlying international interventions. The application of 
the regime concept to international interventions signifies an extension of the 
traditional scope of regime theory in International Relations. An ‘international 
regime’ in International Relations has nothing to do with authoritarian 
government, as the common understanding of ‘regime’ would suggest – 
although this meaning might be applicable to some extent to regimes of 
international intervention. Regime theory understands international regimes as 
a special case of international institutions. It is part of an evolution in which 
students of international relations shifted their focus systematically away from 
formal institutions (i.e. international organizations) toward broader forms of 
institutionalized behavior.131 This new research program was intended to fill 
analytical gaps between the realist and liberal approaches of international 
relations and to tackle more successfully the puzzles of cooperation and 
institution-building. Indeed, the research program of international regimes has 
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shown “remarkable integrative capacity”, bringing not only neorealists and 
neoliberals together but constructivists as well.132 As a result though, there is no 
single theory of international regimes and regime analysis reflects different 
strands of International Relations theory. 
The concept of international regime was drawn from international law 
and emerged in the academic field of International Relations in the mid-1970’s, 
when new ‘liberals’ in the United States, focusing on international political 
economy and interdependence, challenged realism.133 But the concept is not 
identical with the concept of legal regimes in international law because the 
existence of an international regime does not presuppose a binding legal 
instrument.134 Regime analysis became the cornerstone of the neoliberal 
research program and a focal point of the whole discipline. The authors of a 
collection of articles for a special issue of the journal International Organization 
agreed on a common definition of regimes, which identified them as social 
institutions. This definition became known as the so-called ‘consensus 
definition’135 and was presented by Stephen Krasner in his introduction to the 
special issue: “Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit and explicit principles, 
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”136 According to 
Krasner, regime theory began with a simple causal scheme, which “assumed 
that regimes could be conceived of as intervening variables standing between 
basic causal variables (most prominently, power and interests) and outcomes 
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and behavior.”137 His scheme is given below in Figure 1. This also caused 
regime analysis to focus for a long time on regime formation and regime 
effectiveness, neglecting regime evolution.  
 
Figure 1: Regimes as Intervening Variables in IR 
     
Basic Causal 
Variables
 Regimes  Related Behavior and 
Outcomes 
 
Source: Stephen Krasner (ed., 1983): International Regimes, Ithaca NY, p. 5. 
 
Achieving and maintaining consensus on a common definition of 
international regimes has not been easy. The so-called ‘consensus definition’ 
was an important step for the research program, but it did not bring an end to 
the conceptual debate. Scholars critical of regime analysis emphasized the 
complexity and ambiguity of the definition. Susan Strange saw it as “yet one 
more woolly concept that is a fertile source of discussion simply because people 
mean different things when they use it.”138 Indeed, a decade later, Robert 
Keohane called the consensus definition “enormously important and valuable” 
as basis for the attempt to reorient International Relations, but had to admit that 
its complexity and ambiguity made it “subject to confusing differences of 
interpretation.”139 
All these conceptual discussions have led to a new ‘operational version’ 
of the consensus definition, which includes a formal and a behavioral 
dimension.140 Keohane’s amended “lean definition” bears the mark of this new 
consensus: “[…] regimes can be identified by the existence of explicit rules that 
are referred to in affirmative manner by governments, even if they are not 
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necessarily scrupulously observed.”141 Based on this, I have proposed the 
following definition: “international regimes are sets of explicit principles, norms, 
rules, and decision-making procedures that are referred to in affirmative manner 
by actors in a specific issue-area of international relations, even if they are not 
necessarily scrupulously observed.”142 As a consequence, a regime might be 
based on legal regimes or non-binding declarations. Levy, Young and Zürn 
have developed a typology of regime definitions based on the conceptual 
debate around formality and the behavioral aspect (“convergence of 
expectations”).143 It is displayed below in Table 2. From the discussion above, it 
should be clear that my operational definition of regimes focuses on ‘dead-letter 
regimes’ and ‘full-blown regimes’. After identifying them, we might be able to 
identify ‘tacit regime’ based on successful or failed cooperation that cannot be 
explained otherwise.  
 
Table 2: A Typology of Regime Definitions 
 CONVERGENCE OF EXPECTATIONS 
FORMALITY Low High 
Low 
no regimes tacit regimes 
High dead-letter regimes classic regimes 
[or “full-blown regimes”] 
 
Source: Marc Levy/Oran Young/Michael Zürn (1995): The Study of International Regimes, in: 
European Journal of International Relations 1, p. 272. 
 
It is important to stress two uncontroversial, yet crucial implications of the 
regime concept.144 These implications answer some of the criticism mentioned 
above. First, international regimes are international institutions and should be 
studied as such, i.e. they have rather stable sets of rules, roles and 
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relationships. Second, international regimes and international organizations are 
neither synonymous nor co-extensional (i.e. refer to the same entities). Often 
regimes are accompanied by organizations designed or employed to support 
them. Contrary, rather universal organizations can host several regimes. There 
are two points that can help to distinguish between organizations and regimes: 
(1) Organizations are concrete entities for a certain purpose, have formal 
procedures, bureaucratic structures and leadership, which permit them to react 
to events on their own (at least to some extent), while regimes are conceptual 
creations and consider broader forms of institutionalized behavior, which 
include informal and habitual elements. (2) International organizations like the 
United Nations do not have to be limited to special issue-areas of international 
relations, whereas regimes are issue-specific by definition. In sum, there is an 
analytical distinction between international regimes and international 
organizations, but the study of regimes should not be artificially separated from 
the study of formal organizations, because, as outlined, regimes and 
organizations are often connected.145 
Regime analysis has not proven to be a “passing fad”, as one of its 
strongest opponent, Susan Strange, once called it.146 Students of international 
regimes admit that it might have lost some of its “earlier charm”, due to its 
failure to produce a single robust theory to account for international cooperation, 
but stress that there is still strong interest in the concept because substantive 
questions of regime analysis count among the major foci of International 
Relations in both Europe and North America: What accounts for the emergence 
of instances of rule-based cooperation in the international system? And how do 
international institutions (such as regimes) affect actors in world politics? A vast 
literature on research conducted over various issue-areas reflects the interest in 
regime theory. Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, a group of German 
International Relations scholars, identify three broad perspectives on 
international regimes in their comprehensive review of the regime analysis 
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literature.147 They call these perspectives ‘schools of thought’148 and classify 
them according to the explanatory variables they emphasize as ‘power-based’, 
‘interest-based’ and ‘knowledge-based’ theories of international regimes. This 
distinction reflects the recent debate between rationalists (realists and 
neoliberals) and constructivists (which Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger call 
‘cognitivists’) in mainstream International Relations.  
For constructivists, knowledge is crucial because intersubjective 
knowledge provides the link between the environment and actor behavior. 
Constructivists rely on a sociological perspective of international relations, 
which, according to Alexander Wendt, comprises two ‘basic tenets’: “(1) that the 
structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather 
than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors 
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Table 3: Schools of thought in the study of international regimes 
 
REALISM NEOLIBERALISM COGNITIVSIM 
(esp. “strong 
cognitiv.”) 
Central variable Power interests knowledge 
“Instituionalism”* Weak Medium strong 
Meta-theoretical 
orientation 
Rationalistic rationalistic sociological 
Behavioral model concerned 
with relative 
gains 
absolute gains 
maximizer 
role-player 
 
* This means, to what degree do institutions influence actors’ behavior in international relations? 
Source: Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger (1997): Theories of International Regimes, 
Cambridge, p. 6. 
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are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.”149 Thus, 
constructivists ask how actors’ preferences, which neorealists and neoliberals 
take as given, are shaped. Table 3 below displays Hasenclever, Mayer and 
Rittberger’s classification of regime analysis. It is a useful guide for the 
theoretical discussions of the regime concept and what research in regime 
analysis can focus on. 
At this point it is time to summarize and repeat some of the main criticism 
of regime theory.150 The lack of a precise theory is one of the main criticism of 
regime theory. Many see it as a necessary consequence of the consensus 
definition, which was able to attract so many scholars from different schools of 
thought. As Crawford put it, “the usability of the well-known Krasner definition 
seems to be correlated directly to its lack of analytical precision.”151 The 
ambiguities of the concept were already discussed above. Its critiques follow 
from these difficulties that regime theory will produce little long-term 
contributions to the knowledge of the discipline. The state-centric approach of 
regime theory is another important point raised by critiques, but there have 
been systematic attempts to include non-state actors within regime theory.152 
Furthermore, critiques accuse regime theory of being value-biased because it 
puts order and status quo above justice in the international system, thus, 
neglects the issue of distributive justice.153 While the issue of justice had indeed 
been neglected, it was never fully absent and more recently there are even 
systematic efforts to integrate the aspect of justice into regime theory.154 
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In sum, regime theory seems to suffer from shortcomings of International 
Relations as a whole and a pluralism of theoretical explanations that is familiar 
to the whole discipline. After all, it is only an analytical concept that tries to help 
to understand important real world phenomena. Even Crawford, one of the most 
proponent critiques of regime theory had to admit, “[t]hat regimes do refer to 
substantive phenomena in international politics is undeniable, but it remains 
difficult to establish whether regimes are pervasive, or relatively exceptional, 
aspects of international relations.”155 
Finally, I want to present a selection of real world phenomena that regime 
theory has been applied to. Regime analysis focused mainly on four types of 
issue-areas: communication regimes, economic regimes, environmental 
regimes and security regimes.156 The first three types are very much at the 
heart of neoliberal approach because they mostly represent clear transnational 
problems and shared interests among states. Security regimes focused on 
issues of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the ABM-Treaty, but also got 
down to security regimes on a smaller scale, like the Berlin regime of the Allies 
during the Cold War and NATO conventional forces levels in central Europe.157 
There have been applications of regime theory to issue-areas that are related 
to our topic, regimes of international intervention. The clearest one is the so-
called ‘Berlin regime’ of the four Allied Powers after the Second World War. 
Although it became soon dysfunctional in many ways, it continued to function in 
many other ways.158 This is probably the first example of the concept of regime 
being applied to a direct intervention. Another area is very closely linked to 
regimes of intervention, peace implementation regimes, because some peace 
treaties can provide the basis for direct interventions. This application derives of 
course from the classical use of the legal regime concept in international law: 
international treaty regimes. But not all of such treaties have to allow direct 
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interventions. The most recent example of the use of the concept to a peace 
process which did not constitute a direct intervention is the ‘peace 
implementation regime in Nicaragua’.159 I have suggested a more systematic 
application of the regime concept to direct interventions, when I argued that we 
could identify a new type of security regime: regimes of international 
intervention. In an application of regime analysis to one case study, the 
international level of the peace implementation process in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, I have shown the usefulness of this extension of the regime 
concept to a new issue-area.160 
According to the operational definition of a regime as I have adopted it above 
– “international regimes are sets of explicit principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures that are referred to in affirmative manner by actors 
in a specific issue-area of international relations, even if they are not necessarily 
scrupulously observed” – I can derive three steps of identifying a regime of 
international intervention. First I have to present the international agreement(s) 
(“sets of explicit principles…”) the regime is based on and which also outline(s) 
the regime content and it components, especially its principles and norms. In a 
second step, I have to outline the structure of the regime, i.e. its organizational 
form, which in turn also reflects its rules and decision-making procedures. 
Finally, I have to conduct a check if the international actors in the issue-area 
refer to the regime in an affirmative manner. 
 
Proposing a dynamic model of regime analysis 
Simply applying the traditional regime analysis framework of International 
Relations will not bring us much closer to our goal, because it is usually seen as 
too static to cover the underlying political processes. We need to adopt a 
dynamic regime model. Usually, the traditional focus of research has been on 
regime formation and compliance. This has to do with regime theory’s Cold War 
background, where regime impact and regime compliance was measured 
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against the role of hegemonic states.161 One also has to recall the impact of the 
neorealist-neoliberal debate on the research agenda. The main thrust of all the 
research was “do regimes matter?”. In all this research though, some topics 
have been neglected, like regime sustainability, related regime operation, 
regime adaptation, and regime transformation. How would a regime remain vital 
to the interests of their stakeholders? The evolutionary process of regimes was 
often neglected, despite that “[r]egimes are born through negotiation processes, 
and they evolve through postagreement negotiation processes.”162 
Indeed, one of the biggest criticisms of regime theory was its static nature. As 
one observer put it in the context of security studies, “[a]pplied specifically to the 
problem of security, it is not clear how much further this concept [international 
regime] takes us in understanding the dynamics of security relations than the 
early twentieth century idea of collective security, or indeed the ‘concert’ system 
following the Congress of Vienna in 1815.”163 To overcome this deficit is what 
the research of the Processes of International Negotiations (PIN) project at the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) aimed at. Recently 
they have proposed to provide a more accurate or dynamic account of 
international regimes.164 They want to build on the body of work already 
available while correcting it. They think they can profit from a clearer 
understanding of regimes and that the passage of time allows to study the 
evolution of regimes. As William Zartman put it, “[r]egime building is ongoing 
negotiation.”165 Negotiations on an initial agreement are followed by 
postagreement negotiations on regime implementation and adaptation. All these 
negotiations are two dimensional because they take place on an international 
level between the states and organizations involved and on a domestic level 
within states and organizations. 
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Zartman complains that much of the current studies of regimes “miss the 
basic nature of a regime as a living thing, established in response to a problem 
of cooperation under conditions of uncertainty and evolving – indeed, expanding 
and contracting – as part of a continual re-creation process.”166 Indeed, in my 
previous study of the regime of the Dayton Peace Process for Bosnia, I found it 
most striking how the regime had evolved as an exercise of joint problem-
solving. I was also struck by the largely informal processes and procedures that 
governed the regime and led to some necessary adaptations of the regime. It 
was difficult for me to fully account for this observation with the traditional focus 
of regime analysis.167 Thus, my case study of the international intervention 
regime in Bosnia after Dayton confirmed the need for a more dynamic regime 
model. 
Now the PIN group has come up with such a dynamic regime model and I am 
sure it will serve well renewed interest in regime analysis. I intend to incorporate 
it in my proposal for a comprehensive and coherent comparative analysis of all 
state-building interventions since the end of the Cold War. In a similar way as 
“[m]ost of the regime literature focuses on why states cooperate and neglects 
how states cooperate in conceptual terms”168, much of the literature on 
intervention focuses on why states intervene and neglects how states intervene 
in conceptual terms. Indeed, how do states sustain their cooperation on such a 
difficult and contested task as an international intervention? I want to address 
this problem by looking at the political processes underlying international 
interventions, especially how and on what basis decision-makers decided to 
intervene, to build a regime of intervention and to sustain and adapt it. 
Bertram Spector has proposed a dynamic regime model with eight 
components, a ‘conceptual framework’ as he called it. Six of those components 
regard regime dynamics (postagreement negotiation), one the initial regime 
formation process (preagreement negotiation) and another the measurement of 
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regime effectiveness.169 He splits the six regime dynamics components along 
two dimensions, the international and the domestic one.170 While I find this 
model extremely useful, I want to abandon the international – domestic 
distinction in proposing my own adapted model (see Figure 2 above). The 
reason is that Spector developed his model with a focus on environmental 
regimes, in which steps like ratification, domestic rule-making and domestic 
enforcement are incredibly important – and a similar argument can be made 
about communications regimes, economic regimes and security regimes on 
weapons control – but for regimes of international interventions, such steps are 
less significant under these headings. This does not mean that the domestic 
level does not matter, on the contrary, I just want to account for it in a different 
way. Below, I propose my conceptual framework for analyzing international 
intervention regimes, or more specifically state-building intervention regimes as 
discussed above. 
 
Figure 2: Conceptual Framework of Intervention Regimes 
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I think this new dynamic model as I propose it will be a good conceptual 
framework for an analysis of international regimes. I abandoned the 
international-domestic level distinction that Spector used and replace it with an 
actors-issue-matrix that I want to use as an overlay to the process stages of the 
dynamic regime model (see Figure 3 below). With this matrix, I want to 
introduce all levels-of-analysis and areas-of-analysis that are relevant to state-
building interventions since the end of the Cold War. The levels of analysis are 
more or less the standard levels used in International Relations adapted to the 
issue-area of this paper, international interventions.171 I think it is most useful to 
start on the global level and see what it can account for in all of the four issue-
areas that are relevant for any state-building intervention and then go down 
through all other levels to the individual level. The issue-areas that I have given 
have been identified in this or a similar way by a number of comparative 
studies.172 Public security includes issues like external defence, disarmament 
and demobilization, border control and police. Governance and participation 
includes things as drafting a constitution, appointing transitory governments, 
holding elections and establishing democratic freedoms. Justice and human 
rights includes post-conflict justice, the rule of law and the guarantee of 
fundamental human rights. The economic and social well-being includes 
humanitarian assistance, public infrastructure, the market and the availability of 
goods, education and so on. 
 
Figure 3: Actors-Task-Matrix Overlay for Processes of Dynamic Regimes  
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As can be seen in Figure 2 above, I am want to address three analytical 
phases of regime dynamics as they have been discussed in the regime 
literature. The first phase is regime formation, which includes the process of 
preagreement negotiations on the agreement that provides the basis for the 
intervention and the agreement itself as a constitutional document. The 
constitutional document will provide for the regime components. The second 
phase is regime evolution, which starts of with the implementation of the 
agreement through building the regime institutions, followed by operational 
governance of the intervention and adjustments as necessary, resulting in an 
amended or new agreement, again embodied in an constitutional document. 
The governance and adjustment stages can form a rather continuous feed-back 
loop. It has to be understood that all negotiations are considered to be 
multidimensional and can go through all the levels of analysis as they have 
been proposed above. The final analytical phase is regime effectiveness, which 
cannot really be separated from the regime evolution phase except for 
analytical purposes. Three categories of measuring effectiveness seem 
appropriate. First, a sustainable success, that means if the state-building 
intervention can come to an end, leaving a strengthened and viable state 
behind. Secondly, a temporary success, that means if the state-building 
intervention is able to continue and adapt to new challenges without having 
created a fully viable state yet. Thirdly, a demise or failure of the regime, that 
means, that the outside actors disengage from the regime, even completely 
withdraw from it without having created or improved a viable state in that 
moment. 
The analytical framework as I have outlined it above can be operationalized 
for research through an analytical approach focusing on the three phases I have 
explained above. First, one should start with an analysis of the structure and the 
process of pre-intervention negotiations. What is the nature of the conflict and 
the target society/state? What are the interests of relevant states and 
organizations, and what is the available ‘intervention capacity’ (I will explain this 
concept below) at the relevant point in time? How did the negotiation process 
go? One should give a relevant account of events, apply the actors-issue matrix 
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to it and analyze the resulting agreement. Secondly, one should analyze regime 
structure (its components) and the processes of regime evolution. In the 
constitutional documents and related practice of the regime (peace agreements, 
resolutions, declarations), we can identify the regime components (principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures) and designated key actors. Later 
changes to the regime structure can be shown by analyzing amended or new 
constitutional documents. There should be an account of the relevant 
institutionalization, governance and adjustment negotiation processes, including 
accounts of events on important decisions and actions. We can use the actors-
issue-matrix to introduce all relevant levels-of-analysis and sectors-of-analysis 
and we should account for the impact of changes in what I call ‘intervention 
capacity’ (see below). Thirdly, one should analyze regime effectiveness. What is 
the impact of the regime on the target society and the international community? 
Is the regime a sustainable success, temporary success or failure/demise? 
What are the related changes in ‘intervention capacity’ that take place because 
of the regime? 
‘Intervention capacity’ is a new analytical concept that I propose to account 
for the factors that can have influenced the decision-makers in their negotiations 
on intervention regimes. I want to distinguish three areas of ‘intervention 
capacity’. First, the legal framework: what does universal and regional 
international law, as well as domestic law, say about the options for a particular 
intervention? Second, the conceptual framework beyond law: what were the 
perceived options for a particular intervention. We can identify this conceptual 
framework in various related policy documents and analyze what they say and 
what they are expecting. Finally, the material framework, that means the 
availability of material and financial resources as well as trained personnel for 
any intervention. 
I am confident that based on this conceptual framework, the analytical gap in 
the debate on interventions since the end of the Cold War can be closed. 
Research applying this analytical framework should be able to shed new light 
on the political processes underlying international interventions. It should help to 
explain not only why, but also how policy-makers decide to intervene, or not to 
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intervene, and maintain, or fail to maintain, the intervention until it has achieved 
a certain goal. As explained, I see this goal as state-building. I think a coherent 
and comparative analysis of regimes of state-building interventions will allow us 
to make generalizations on some important trends in our evolving world order 
since the end of the Cold War. For example, maybe we can identify a new tacit 
meta-regime on international intervention, but maybe not. 
 
5. Conclusions: A Research Proposal 
This paper wanted to explain the political nature of the most difficult 
contemporary international intervention, state-building intervention, and suggest 
a new analytical approach to answer the challenges it poses to scholars and 
policy-makers. It explained the continued relevance of the state for our 
conceptualization of world order and why state-building intervention has 
become such an important tool in maintaining world order. Such state-building 
interventions assume direct government authority in other societies, to an extent 
unparalleled since the end of colonialism and the ideological struggle of the 
Cold War. These latter political associations and the current universality of the 
legal principle of state sovereignty pose a political and moral dilemma for 
authors of intervention. Interveners have to come up with an answer on how 
they want to reconcile their undertaking with the peoples’ right of self-
determination and the norm of state sovereignty, which is supposed to secure 
international order, the very some goal that the authors eventually have to claim 
as the legitimate basis of their state-building intervention. In this sense, it should 
have become clear that providing an answer to the question “who will intervene 
where, when, how and for what purpose?”, will reveal much about the world we 
live in today. 
Unfortunately, the debate on international intervention has produced much 
confusion so far, because it has largely focused on the policies for intervention 
that different schools of political philosophy prescribe or on fragmented 
analyses of the “lessons learned”. But there is no general theory of intervention 
that fits all cases and “who will intervene where, when, how and for what 
purpose?” is an inherently political question that will be decided differently from 
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case to case. This is not the least so because it will depend on the perceptions, 
values and beliefs of those persons who have the authority and power to order 
an intervention on behalf of the state or organization they lead. Often values 
and power are treated separately in world politics, but only when they are 
treated as intertwined, we truly know in which order we live in. Power is not 
used as a means in itself but to achieve certain goals that are derived from 
ideas and values, while values that are not backed up by power can hardly 
provide order when challenged. Thus, what is more useful is to produce 
generalizations on the political challenge that current interventions pose to 
decision-makers and analysts alike.  
Because any intervention is the result of political negotiation and 
compromise, we should focus on the processes that make them happen or not 
and that lead to their success or failure. I want to argue that if we analyze in a 
coherent and comprehensive way the political decision-making processes of 
past international interventions, we can learn a lot more about where the debate 
on international interventions is leading us and how future international 
interventions might look like. To conduct such research, I proposed a dynamic 
model of regime analysis because we can understand interventions as 
international regimes. This model still needs to be applied to a better 
researched list of case studies. Another question is to what extent it can also 
cover external involvement which does not result in an intervention effecting 
directly the government authority structure of the target society. Furthermore, it 
should also be worthwhile to develop a set of hypothesis based on previous 
conceptual and comparative case studies.173 In sum, research based on my 
proposed analytical framework should not only tell us more about past and 
current interventions from a coherent and comprehensive comparative 
perspective, but also indicate more general trends for ongoing and future 
interventions. 
I should end my paper with a word of warning on the effective value of my 
proposed model of analysis. In accordance with the political nature of the 
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question of intervention as I have outlined it above, the political analyst might 
thus face failure in providing effective policy options when he or she turns into a 
policy advisor who is competing with policy options based on other 
assumptions, analysis or ideology. The futile but well-grounded efforts of many 
experts in Washington, D.C. before the Iraq intervention are just the latest 
example.174 
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